THE CURIOUS CONFUSION SURROUNDING
ESCOBEDO v. ILLINOIS
Arrested on suspicion of murder, Danny Escobedo was interrogated
by police until he confessed. Throughout the interrogation, his frequent requests to call his attorney were denied, and he was never
advised by the police of his right to remain silent. The Supreme Court
reversed the subsequent conviction:
We hold ... that where, as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," . . .1
In recent months, both federal and state courts have differed greatly
over the interpretation to be given this decision. Responsibility for
this inconsistency can in part be placed on the opinion of the Court
itself. For in the first place, while the holdirg is carefully confined
to the facts, sweeping language in Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion
appears to justify a more expansive interpretation. 2 Second, the Court
failed to deal conclusively with prior case law; some cases which should
have been expressly overruled were left standing, while others were
inadequately distinguished.
Despite these problems, it is submitted that',a careful examination
1 Escobedo v. Illinois, 878 'U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). See generally Christensen,
Pretrial Right to Counsel, MILITARY L. REV. 1 (Jan. 1964); Enker & Elsen, Counsel
for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV.
47 (1964); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation, The Right to Counsel and to
Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24 (1960); Vorenberg, Police Detention
and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the States, 44
B.U.L. REv. 423 (1964); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in PoLIcE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FaEEDOM 153 (1962); Comment, 73 YALE
L.J. 1000 (1964).
2 878 U.S. at 488-90. Moreover, the clear indication that Escobedo will not be
confined to its facts was a major stimulant of the three vigorous dissents.
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of Escobedo in the context of other recent right to counsel cases
demonstrates that the interpretive difficulties encountered by the lower
courts are unnecessary. The inconsistent interpretations of this decision
on the part of state and lower federal courts probably stem not so much
from difficulties with the meaning of the decision, but from an all
too poignant judicial awareness of it. The many cases distinguishing
Escobedo probably represent disagreement as to the policy behind the
decision, and constitute resistance on the part of the lower courts to
an uncertain and controversial doctrine.
The Court in Escobedo was primarily concerned with protecting the
rights of the accused by guaranteeing a right to counsel which accrues
and becomes unqualified at the point at which the criminal "process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory . . . . 3 It is the thesis of this
comment that the right is unqualified-unless the right is properly
waived, the absence of counsel is in itself grounds for the exclusion
from trial of all information prejudicial to the accused and the "fruits"
thereof obtained during the police interrogation. This right is conditioned neither upon a request nor on delicate judicial analyses of
the particular defendant's need for counsel or of the degree of prejudice resulting from its denial. It is the purpose of this comment to
demonstrate that this conclusion is inescapable. Unlike most of the
commentary on this landmark decision in constitutional criminal procedure, this comment will examine neither the implications on the
enforcement of the criminal laws, nor the policy judgment of Escobedo
v. Illinois.
I.
Until Escobedo, the law on the right to counsel during police
interrogations was represented by the companion cases, Crooker v.
California4 and Cicenia v. LaGay.5 In both cases the defendants were
convicted of murder on the basis of confessions obtained during intermittent police interrogation following arrest. Both defendants had
requested, but were denied permission to call an attorney. In fact,
Cicenia's attorney attempted to, but was not permitted to communicate
with his client. Crooker was a thirty-one year old college graduate who
had completed one year of law school, and who had been informed of
his right to silence; Cicenia was only twenty-one years old with little
more than a grammar school education, 6 and there was no evidence in
the record that he was ever advised of his right to remain silent.
3

Id. at 492.

4

357 U.S. 433 (1958).

5 357 U.S. 504 (1958).

6 Record, pp. 66-68, Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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On the same day, the Supreme Court by a majority of five justices
affirmed both convictions. Crooker had contended that his confession
had been admitted into evidence erroneously because it was involuntary
and because he had been denied the assistance of counsel. But the
Court found the confession to be voluntary in light of the supposed
intelligence of the accused, his knowledge of his right to silence and
the absence of any physical coercion. To dispose of the second contention, the Court applied to the interrogation stage the Betts v. Brady7
standard that the absence of counsel in non-capital trials would render
a conviction reversible only when it resulted in a denial of "that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."8
Ascertaining the existence of "fundamental fairness," like determining
the voluntariness of a confession, entails an analysis of all the circumstances of the case. In so doing, the Court emphasized the intelligence
and experience of the accused 9 and concluded that "the sum total of
all the circumstances here during the time the petitioner was without
counsel is a voluntary confession by a college educated man with law
school training who knew of his right to keep silent."1 0 It followed
that the "fundamental fairness" guaranteed by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment had not been infringed."'
It is significant that the majority did not stop here, but went on to
discuss the implications of Crooker's contention that a denial of the
assistance of counsel was in itself a deprivation of due process. Of
7 316 U.S. 455 (1942). For a discussion of the relationship of Betts and Crooker,
see Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice,
8 DE PAUL L. REV. 213, 225-33 (1959).

8 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (quoting from Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). It is significant that Crooker is a capital case. As
the dissenters point out, "Betts v. Brady, which never applied to a capital case, see
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [1932], is now made to do so." Id. at 443. The majority
attempted to meet this argument in a footnote where it distinguished between due
process at a trial and due process at an interrogation. Id. at 441 n.6.
9 As will be seen from a discussion of Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), it is
doubtful whether these factors were material to the holding of the Court. See text
accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
-10 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958). A study has demonstrated that
contrary to the Court's characterization, Crooker was a very confused, mentally disturbed defendant with doubtful capacity to make a voluntary, objective statement.
PRErrYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 167-257 (1961).
11 Cf., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (confession of a fifteen-year-old boy after
prolonged interrogation during which the boy's attorney was denied access to the
accused held inadmissible); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) (absence of
counsel during a police interrogation is merely a factor to be considered when determining the voluntariness of a confession). For a collection of cases in which factors
in addition to the absence of counsel were held to deny "fundamental fairness," see
Rothblatt 8- Rothblatt, supra note 1, at 29 n.23.
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primary concern was the fear that such an absolute right to counsel
would drastically curtail effective law enforcement:
[T]he doctrine suggested by petitioner would have a...
devastating effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfairuntil the accused was afforded opportunity to call his attorney.12
Which of these two considerations-fundamental fairness to the
accused or the fear of interference with criminal law enforcement-was
3
of primary concern to the majority is revealed in Cicenia v. LaGay.'
Cicenia had contended that his confession should have been excluded,
not because it was involuntary, but because he had been denied the
assistance of counsel. 14 This case shows that the Court was not as concerned with "fundamental fairness" as it appeared to be in Crooker.
The intelligence and experience of the accused were not considered
at all.
The Court's disinclination to rely entirely on the totality of the
circumstances or on "fundamental fairness" is emphasized by its expanded discussion of the policy considerations mentioned in Crooker.15
Underlying the Cicenia opinion was the theory that federalism allows
the states to "have the widest latitude in the administration of their
own systems of criminal justice."'16 Again, the majority was fearful
of sanctioning a right which "would constrict state police activities in
a manner that in many instances might impair their ability to solve
difficult cases."' 7 Thus, as the facts of Cicenia indicate, it was primarily
this fear, rather than the "fundamental fairness" calculus, which was
determinative to the majority in both Cicenia and Crooker. In this
respect, Cicenia rather than Crooker, is the significant case because it
demonstrates that the majority's primary concern was for effective law
enforcement.
Crooker and Cicenia evoked vigorous dissents which are significant,
not only because the dissenters included the Chief Justice and Justices
Black, Brennan' s and Douglas, who, in addition to Mr. Justice Goldberg,
later formed the majority in Escobedo, but because they enunciated
the policies underlying the Escobedo decision. Although framed in the
12 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958).
1s

357 U.S. 504 (1958).

14 Cicenia made no claim of coercion in the Supreme Court.

15 See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
16 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958) (quoting from Hoag v. New Jersey,

356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958)).
'7 Id. at 509.

18 Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in Cicenia.
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conventional language of "fundamental fairness," the dissent in Crooker' 9
was concerned with a right to counsel which, if infringed, would itself
constitute "a denial of that due process of law guaranteed the citizen
by the Fourteenth Amendment," without regard to any other circumstances. 20 The minority contemplated two functions to be performed
by counsel. First, the assistance of counsel enables the accused properly
to exercise his rights; counsel is necessary to fulfill this function even
when the accused, as in Crooker, is highly intelligent:
No matter how well educated and how well trained in the law
an accused may be, he is sorely in need of legal advice once he
is arrested ....
[He] may be caught in a web of circumstantial
evidence that is difficult to break. . . . He may be implicated
21
by ambiguous circumstances difficult to explain away.

A second and more extensive function of counsel is to act "as a
restraint on the coercive power of the police." 22 To be an effective
check against "secret inquisitions" 23 and police excesses generally, the
right to counsel must also exist independently of the intelligence or
experience of the accused. In addition, the minority believed that the
presence of counsel would eliminate the difficult task of proving coercion
in cases where a confession was obtained during a dosed interrogation:
"The trial of the issue of coercion is seldom helpful. Law officers usually
testify one way, the accused another. The citizen who has been the
24
victim of these secret inquisitions has little chance to prove coercion."
With counsel present, the problem of police excesses would never arisewith counsel absent, the minority would reverse the conviction. Thus,
the voluntariness of confessions would never be in issue.
To the minority, therefore, due process required that an accused be
afforded the right to the presence of counsel during a police interrogation culminating in a confession. This right to counsel was to be unqualified in the sense that it would not depend on the intelligence of
the accused, his knowledge of his right to counsel or any of the other
"surrounding circumstances." The minority had thus rejected the
"fundamental fairness" test and the voluntary-involuntary distinction
employed by the majority.
The Cicenia dissent relied specifically on the dissenting opinion in Crooker.
Crooker v. California, 857 U.S. 433, 442 (1958).
21 Id. at 446-47.
22 Id. at 443.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 443-44. See McCoRmKi,
EVIDENCE 233 (1954); Dession, The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure:I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1946); Kamisar, Illegal Searches
or Seizures and ContemporaneousIncriminatingStatements: A Dialogue on a Neglected
Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 141.
19

20
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A few years later, on very similar facts, the Supreme Court reached
a different result. In Haynes v. Washington,25 the defendant had been
convicted of robbery on the basis of a confession obtained during a
lengthy period of police interrogation. Haynes had been repeatedly
denied permission to call his wife or attorney and was never advised
of his right to remain silent. Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for a majority
composed of the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas,
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the confession was involuntary. The significance of the decision lies in the extremes to which
the majority went in order to find coercion. The only uncontroverted
fact upon which the finding was based was the refusal of the police
to permit the accused to call his wife or attorney. Joined by Justices
Harlan, Stewart and White in dissent, Mr. Justice Clark not only
refuted the majority's interpretation of the facts, but pointed out that
the majority had ignored that Haynes was of age, was intelligent, had
criminal experience and probably knew of his right to silence. The
minority argued that in light of the facts in Croaker, Haynes' confession
was clearly voluntary.
This unusual extension of the voluntary-involuntary test can only
be attributed to the policy motivating the majority. The appointment
of Mr. Justice Goldberg to the Court had converted the Crooker and
Cicenia minorities into the Haynes majority. As in the dissents in the
earlier cases, the absence of counsel was considerably more significant
than merely one factor in the determination of the voluntariness of a
confession. The majority was concerned with ensuring both the assistance
of counsel as a method of guaranteeing full exercise by an accused of
his rights, and also the presence of counsel as a protection against coercive
police tactics 2 6 As in the dissent in Crooker, the majority believed that
the effectiveness of these guarantees was dependent upon the presence
of counsel under all circumstances, and that this in turn was dependent
upon an unqualified right to counsel. The Croaker dissent, by urging an
unqualified right to counsel in terms of the "fundamental fairness"
test, implicitly rejected the "fundamental fairness" test which was
designed to avoid absolute rights; whereas, the Haynes majority created
what was for all practical purposes an unqualified right to counsel by
so distorting the voluntary-involuntary test as to render it meaningless.
Massiah v. United States,27 although concerned with a federal post373 U.S. 503 (1963).
Id. at 514: "Here . . . the petitioner was alone in the hands of the police, with
no one to advise or aid him, and he had no reason not to believe that the police had
ample power to carry out their threats."
27 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
25

26
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indictment situation, is significant because of the novel approach taken
by the majority. Massiah had been convicted of a federal narcotics
offense on the basis of incriminating statements made after indictment.
The statements had been obtained by Government agents who, by
means of an electronic listening device, overheard a conversation between
Massiah and a co-defendant, who had both been released on bail pending
trial. The Court 28 refused to consider the defendant's fourth amendment
contention, but reversed the conviction because the incriminating statements were obtained in violation of defendant's sixth amendment right
to the assistance of counsel.29 Thus, for the first time, the majority
utilized the sixth amendment to implement an unqualified right to
counsel prior to trial. Neither the "fundamental fairness" test, 0 nor
8
the voluntary-involuntary distinction was mentioned in the opinion. '
Finally, it is important to note two significant opinions handed down
between Crooker and Escobedo. First, in Gideon v. Wainwright,32 the
Court discarded the "fundamental fairness" test of Betts and held
that the right to court-appointed counsel in state trials was guaranteed
by fourteenth amendment due process. This was significant not only
28 The majority was composed of the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Brennan,
Douglas, Goldberg and Stewart. Mr. Justice Stewart was in the majority only because
the case involved a post-indictment violation of the right to counsel. See Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting on grounds that Cicenia v.
LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) was controlling).
29 The holding was based on the concurring opinions in Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959), where, following the indictment, the defendant had been interrogated
for more than eight hours in the absence of counsel. The concurring opinions of
Mr. Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan) and Mr. Justice Douglas
(joined by Justices Black and Brennan) contended that the subsequently obtained
confession should have been inadmissible, not because it was involuntary, as the
majority held, but because the police had violated defendant's right to counsel. It
should be noted that in Massiah the brief for the petitioner did not even argue the
right-to-counsel point, upon which the Court's holding was based.
80 The "fundamental fairness" test has never been used in federal cases, where the
sixth amendment has always been applicable. It was developed for use in non-capital
state cases, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and extended to the pre-trial phases
of both capital and non-capital proceedings, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
31 A vigorous dissent was based on the majority's "scrapping the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility in this area" and the supposed effect of an absolute right
to counsel on the ability of society to "maintain its capacity to discover transgressions
of the law and to identify those who flout it." Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
207, 210 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, while discussing the implications of
the Massiah holding, Mr. Justice White predicted the Escobedo result: "The reason
given for the result here--the admissions were obtained in the absence of counselwould seem equally pertinent to statements obtained at any time after the right to
counsel attaches, whether there has been an indictment or not ... and ... to criminal proceedings in state courts." Id. at 208.
82 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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because it raised the possibility that Massiah, decided the following
year, could easily be extended to the states, but because Crooker was
based on the "fundamental fairness" test.
The second case, Hamilton v. Alabama,33 involved a defendant who
had not been represented by counsel during arraignment for a capital
crime. The state supreme court affirmed the subsequent conviction on
34
the grounds that the absence of counsel had not been prejudicial.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that since the arraignment "may
affect the whole trial," it was a "critical stage" at which defendant had
a right to the assistance of counsel without regard to "whether prejudice
resulted."35 Thus, a characteristic of the "critical stage" is the accrual
of an unqualified right to counsel.
II.
Escobedo's incriminating statements constituted the basis for his conviction, which the Illinois Supreme Court sustained citing Crooker and
Cicenia.36 Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for the Chief Justice and Justices
Black, Brennan and Douglas, reversed the conviction, holding that the
statement was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of
defendant's right to the assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment
as made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth. 7 To take seriously
the Court's attempt to confine Escobedo to its facts would be to disregard
the majority's repeatedly expressed intention to provide the accused
with an unqualified right to counsel.
The first effect of Escobedo is to extend the "critical stage" of
Hamilton3 8 forward into the pre-indictment investigation, to the point
at which "the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory."3 9 Mr.
33

368 U.S. 52 (1961).

271 Ala. 88, 122 So. 2d 602 (1960).
35 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961). Hamilton was a capital case.
Had the denial of counsel occurred at the trial, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
rather than Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), would have been applicable. The
significance of Hamilton lies in the fact that in extending the right to counsel to
the pre-trial stages, the Court recognized the unqualified right of Powell rather than,
as it had in Crooker, the "fundamental fairness" approach of Betts. See note 8 supra.
Hamilton was extended in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), where the Court
held per curiam that the preliminary hearing in Maryland was a "critical stage" at
which the defendant had a right to counsel unqualified by judicial analyses of the
degree of prejudice.
386People v. Escobedo, 28 Il. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
37 See text following note 32 supra.
38 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
39 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). An issue which is beyond the scope
of this comment is the meaning of the standard Escobedo establishes to determine at
34

568
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Justice Goldberg noted that the interrogation of Escobedo was "surely
as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton ....

-40 The term "critical

stage" has had a constant meaning for the majority. It was employed
by Mr. Justice Douglas in Hamilton and in dissent in Crooker, and
by Mr. Justice Goldberg in Haynes and Escobedo to designate that
point of the process at which the right to counsel accrues independently
41
of judicial analysis of "fundamental fairness," prejudice or coercion.
Escobedo, in light of the previous cases, also indicates a shift in
emphasis from an analysis of the confession to the presence of counsel
during interrogation. Moreover, it is clear from the Escobedo majority's
earlier opinions that their primary concern is not with "nice calculations" 42 as to the intelligence of the accused, his experience with criminal
procedures or whether he was advised or knew of the right to silence.
This majority would exclude the confession of a thirty-one year old
with a college degree (Crooker) as well as the statement of a twenty-two
year old Mexican with no police experience (Escobedo). They would exclude the confession of Crooker who had been advised of his right to
silence, as well as the confessions of Cicenia and Haynes, who had not
been so advised. They would exclude equally the confessions of Crooker,
Cicenia and Haynes, although Crooker obviously knew of his right to
what point in the investigation the right to counsel accrues. Phrases such as "when
its focus is on the accused," id. at 492, and when "the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,"
id. at 490, are quite subjective and will raise difficult problems of application. For
example, must the police have narrowed the investigation down to one suspect, or
may there be more than one "accused" upon which the process has focused? Does the
"focus" test relate only to the quantity of evidence gathered by the police, or does
the subjective state of mind of the accused have any relevance? Does the test encompass
confessions spontaneously given in the absence of counsel, but not in response to any
questioning? See note 58 infra. Definitional problems have already begun to appear
in the reports. See, e.g., United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (Sd Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1964); Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark. 1964); People v. McElroy, 48 Misc. 2d
924, 252 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Albany County Ct. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Storch v.
Maroney, 204 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1964); Wansley v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 412, 137 S.E.2d
865 (1964).
40 378 U.S. at 486.
41 The unconditional nature of the right is apparent from an examination of
Haynes and Massiah. In Massiah the Court found it necessary to reject the voluntaryinvoluntary test, used with such difficulty in Haynes, which would have compelled a
contrary result, and rather based the reversal on the sixth amendment. In Escobedo,
however, there was adequate evidence---given the extremes of Haynes-to justify a
finding of involuntariness. But, in conformity with its expressed distaste for qualifying tests, the majority "abondon[ed] . . . the voluntary-involuntary test," 378 U.S.
478, 496 (White, J., dissenting), and followed the sixth amendment precedents of
Massiah and Gideon.
42 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 442 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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silence, Haynes probably did as a result of past criminal experience, and
Cicenia most likely did not. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume, as
the dissenters did, that Escobedo was aware of his right to silence even
though he had not been formally advised of it by the police. 43 Thus,
this complete disregard for the "totality of the circumstances" combined
44
with the formal rejection of the "fundamental fairness" test in Gideon
dearly indicates the majority's intention to extend to the accused
during police interrogation an unqualified right to counsel.
This conclusion is not undermined by Mr. Justice Goldberg's assertion that Crooker was distinguishable on the grounds that Crooker,
unlike Escobedo, had been advised of his right to silence. 45 First, the
Court neglected to point out that while Crooker was advised of his
right to silence, the same result had been reached in Cicenia, where
the accused was not so advised.46 Thus, Crooker was distinguished on
a fact which Cicenia indicates was not material. Second, as has been
demonstrated, 47 the majority has never been concerned with whether
the accused knew of his right to silence, much less whether he was
advised of it. It is quite clear that regardless of what the Court said,
Crooker and Cicenia have been overruled. 48 Cicenia is so like Escobedo
on the facts that Justices Harlan and Stewart, in dissent, found it
controlling. The only possible basis for confusion is that while dearly
repudiating the "fundamental fairness" test, the Court failed to overrule explicitly those two earlier decisions which are representative of
the "fundamental fairness" approach.
As expressed by members of the majority previously, 49 an uncon43 This assumption is based on the fact that Escobedo had consulted with his
attorney prior to arrest at which time he was told to say nothing. Furthermore, during
the interrogation Escobedo saw his attorney wave to him, which he testified he interpreted as a warning to remain silent. 378 U.S. at 480 n.1. See Kurland, ForewordThe Supreme Court 1963 Term, 78 HnAv. L. Rx-v. 143, 220-21 (1964).
44 In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the state had
an obligation to provide counsel for an indigent defendant on appeal when that appeal
is a matter of right under state law. The Court avoided using the "fundamental
fairness" test and instead adopted the unqualified approach of Gideon. Thus, in all
recent right-to-counsel cases relating to trial, appeal, and formal pre-trial stages,
the Court has consistently spoken in terms of an unqualified right. This trend has
continued in Escobedo.
45 378 U.S. at 491-92.
46 See text accompanying notes 6, 13-17 supra.
47 See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
48 "In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with
the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling." 378 U.S.
at 492.
49 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 637 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Ashdown v.
Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf., Anonymous v. Baker,
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ditional right to counsel is necessary in order to implement effectively
the twofold function of counsel. 50 First, the assistance of counsel must be
ensured in order that the accused be able to exercise to the fullest extent all of his constitutional rights:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of,
and exercise, these rights.51
Second, the presence of counsel not only provides an effective deterrent
to coercive police practices, but is essential to the proper functioning
of the adversary system:
The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values
which it advances depends upon a constant, searching, and
creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process ....
Persons [denied access
to counsel] are incapable of providing the challenges that are
indispensable to satisfactory operation of the system. The loss
to the interests of accused individuals occasioned by these failures are great and apparent. It is also clear that a situation in
which persons are required to contest a serious accusation but
are denied access to the tools of contest is offensive to fairness
and equity. Beyond these considerations, however, is the fact
that [this situation is] detrimental to the proper functioning
of the system of justice and that the loss in vitality of the adversary system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the
52
basic interests of a free community.
Escobedo holds simply that the absence of counsel after the right has
360 U.S. 287, 298 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957)
(Black, J., dissenting); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
50 The minority is motivated, as it was as a majority in Grooker, by its concern
for federalism and its fear that criminal law enforcement "will be crippled and its
task made a great deal more difficult ......
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499
(1964). Mr. Justice White feared that not only will the new rule be "impossible to
administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover
agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side," but that "one might
just as well argue that a potential defendant is constitutionally entitled to a lawyer
before, not after, he commits a crime ....
Id. at 496-97.
5' 378 U.S. at 490.
52 Id. at 490 n.13 (1964) (quoting from REPORT OF ATrORNEY GENERAL's Cosmin-rm
ON POVERTY AND T=E ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIINAL JusTicE 10-11 (1963)). The
Attorney General's Report did not, however, recommend appointment of counsel at
the arrest stage. See note 92 infra.
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accrued is itself a violation of a constitutional right 53 and is justification
for reversal of any subsequent conviction.5 4
Once this constitutional right is established, however, a remedy must
be devised to rectify infringement of the right. One possibility would
be to reverse any conviction of one who was interrogated without
counsel, whether or not the interrogation produced information in
any way prejudicial to the accused. The other possibility would be
merely to exclude from evidence all prejudicial information obtained at
the interrogation in the absence of counsel. It is submitted that the
latter rule is sufficient. While in no way impairing the right to counsel,
the exclusionary rule would avoid the wholly unjustified grant of
complete immunity from conviction which would arise as a consequence of an illegal interrogation.
Although there is much disagreement as to the deterrent effect of
the Mapp-Weeks exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment, 55 there
53 See Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770, 781 (4th Cir. 1964) (Sobeloff and Bell,
JJ., dissenting): "The doctrinal importance of Escobedo is found in its recognition
that the interrogation of a suspect in police custody is a critical juncture in the
criminal process, and that the inquisition may not be persisted in without according
him the right to counsel." This will in no way affect the admissibility of a voluntary
spontaneous confession obtained immediately following arrest. Cf. United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944); Ramey v. United States, 336 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 840 (1964).
54 Escobedo would seem applicable to pre-hearing investigations of administrative
agencies. Generally, since the administrative process is non-criminal, the sixth amendment is inapplicable, and the right to counsel is wholly statutory. (See 1 DAvis, ADMiNisTRATmW LAW § 8.10 (1958) for a discussion of the rights of parties and witnesses
during administrative proceedings and investigatory hearings.) However, the nature
of the penalties associated with tax and postal fraud, expatriation, deportation, etc.,
has led the courts to recognize, among other things, a constitutional right to counsel
in these proceedings. The investigations and interrogations prior to such proceedings
are no less "critical" to the accused than in the criminal process. See, e.g., Bong Youn
Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960) (admissions obtained after seven hours
of interrogation by immigration officers held involuntary and therefore inadmissible
in deportation proceeding). Indeed, four members of the present majority have indicated that they would not distinguish between criminal and administrative investigations in cases where the latter could lead to criminal sanctions. In In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330 (1957) (witnesses at an investigation by a state fire marshal held not
to have right to counsel), Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Chief Justice and Justices
Brennan and Douglas, dissented and stated in part: "It may be that the type of interrogation which the Fire Marshall and his deputies are authorized to conduct would
not technically fit into the traditional category of formal criminal proceedings, but
the substantive effect of such interrogation on an eventual criminal prosecution of
the person questioned can be so great that he should not be compelled to give testiThe rights of a person
mony when he is deprived of the advice of his counsel ....
. . . should not be destroyed merely because the inquiry is given the euphonious
label 'administrative.'" Id. at 344, 349.
55 See, e.g., Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and
Seizure, in PoLIcE PowER AND INDIvIDUAL FREEooM 77 (Sowle ed. 1962). Compare
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, id. at 99,
with Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-Conduct by the Police, id. at 87.
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is reason to believe that such a rule may be more effective to deter
interrogations without counsel present. First, it has been suggested that
the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment is ineffective to
deter all illegal official conduct because a substantial amount of police
investigation does not contemplate conviction.5 6 However, this is
generally not the case as to interrogations within-the Escobedo rule.
Once an investigation "focuses" on an "accused," one could probably
infer official contemplation of conviction; thus, presumably, the exclusionary rule would be an effective deterrent.
Second, the enforcement of the prohibition against illegal interrogations would probably be considerably more effective than the prevention
of illegal searches and seizures. The fourth amendment protections
apply to all phases of criminal investigation and to all law enforcement
officers, from the chief of police to the corner policeman. Because
of this diversity and because also of the spontaneous nature of many
searches and seizures, it is not surprising that even if supervisory law
enforcement officers actually do attempt to enforce the rules against
illegal searches and seizures, they meet with little or no success. In
contrast, however, the interrogations within the scope of Escobedo
are generally conducted in the police station by experienced detectives
and prosecutors, 7 rather than anywhere in the city by any officer of
the police force. 58 Because of the relatively few officials and limited
sphere of activity encompassed by Escobedo, it is reasonable to assume
that a prosecutor or police chief would have the incentive and the
physical control necessary to enforce the rule prohibiting interrogation
in the absence of counsel. In other words, this phase of the criminal
process, closely associated with judicial proceedings and primarily
concerned with convictions, would seem peculiarly subject to the
deterrent effects of an exclusionary rule.
Thus, as a matter of deterrence, it seems quite unnecessary to utilize
56 See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 39; Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amend-

ment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 54-55.
57 See Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
50 CAL. L. REV. 11, 32, 40 (1962); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police:
An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 336, 379-80 (1962). The
various handbooks and textbooks on criminal investigation suggest that interrogation
be by specially trained officers preferably in the police station. See, e.g., INBAU & REED,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962); Kerr, PracticalPolice Interrogation,
in CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION 392 (Gerber & Schroeder ed. 1962);
O'Conner, Interviewing and Interrogation,id. at 358; O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 79-115 (1956).
58 Those interrogations which occur outside of the police station and which are
conducted by the average police officer are known as "field interrogations" and in
most cases are not within the Escobedo rule. See note 60 infra.
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an absolute rule of reversal. However, it could be argued that since
an exclusionary rule would apply only when the accused has in fact
furnished the police with some incriminating information, only an
absolute rule of reversal will provide a remedy for unproductive illegal
interrogations. However, it seems undesirable to go so far as to hold
that in the absence of a confession, incriminating statement, or other
information prejudicial to an accused, interrogation in the absence of
counsel constitutes a complete bar to conviction. 59 While there is
ample reason for excluding confessions obtained in violation of the
rights of the accused, similar violations which fail to elicit incriminating
statements and are therefore non-prejudicial do not justify immunizing
the defendant from conviction. 60
59 Even assuming any remedy at all is desirable in such an instance, it is doubtful
whether the accused could take advantage of it. In the absence of an incriminating
statement or confession, there would be no evidence of an interrogation, thus making
proof of interrogation in the absence of counsel extremely difficult. The police could
simply deny the charges of the defendant. See text following note 23 supra.
60 The effect Escobedo will have on actual police practices is difficult to predict,
in large part because of the difficulties involved in determining the nature of these
practices, and the similarly difficult problem of defining the "focus" test. However, a
few generalizations can be made. Escobedo will probably not affect the common
practice known as "field" interrogations and the corresponding brief non-arrest police
station interrogation. The goal of such interrogations is generally the elimination
of a large number of suspects from consideration. See Barrett, supra note 57, at 31-32;
LaFave, supra note 57, at 356-65; Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street"
Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges
in General, in PourcE PowER AND INDIVIDUAL FRnmoM 11 (Sowle ed. 1961). Although
such interrogations sometimes lead to sufficient evidence for arrest, the police are generally only engaged in an investigatory process directed at no one in particular. Neither
the literal words nor the rationale of Escobedo seem applicable to such practices. However, it is the next stage of the process to which Escobedo is applicable: where an
arrest has occurred, or where the police have probable cause to arrest but not adequate
evidence to charge or convict. At this point, the police generally detain the person
for investigation and interrogation. See LaFave, supra, at 373-79. Regardless of the
legality of such detention, it is at this stage of the process that the police begin to
build a case against the accused and at which under Escobedo he has a right to
counsel. Escobedo also applies to interrogations of an accused for purposes of determining his role in other crimes and discovering the identity of other offenders, see
LaFave, supra, at 379-84, although incriminating evidence obtained will be admissible
against other offenders because of their lack of standing to object to the illegal interrogation. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). It must be noted that the police
have found such interrogations to be extremely productive of confessions. See, e.g.,
Barrett, supra, at 41-45. It cannot be doubted that the introduction of counsel at this
stage will have a profound effect. However, it remains to be seen whether it will
eliminate the usefulness of interrogations and frustrate law enforcement, or whether
it will merely force the police to rely more on pre-arrest investigations and noninterrogation techniques. It must be noted further that as long as it is unknown
exactly what kinds of crimes are solved by the interrogation of accused individuals,
it will be impossible to predict the effect of Escobedo on the enforcement of the
criminal laws.
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I.
The foregoing analysis has seemed necessary because many recent
state and federal decisions have refused to acknowledge this interpretation of Escabedo. These cases raise two basic issues. First, whether and
in what manner the right declared in Escobedo can be waived? Second,
whether advising the accused of his right to silence can constitute a
substitute for the right to counsel guarantee?
Escobedo had repeatedly requested permission to call his attorney.
As a result, various courts have held either that Escobedo is inapplicable
where the accused fails to request counsel, or that such failure constitutes a waiver by the accused of the right. 61 Also, Escobedo had not
been informed of his right to counsel. As a consequence, other state
courts have seized upon this fact to hold that the right is waived when
62
the record shows that the accused was advised of the right.
Holding that the right to counsel depends upon a formal request
is contrary to federal standards for waiver of constitutional rights, which,
it is submitted, should be, and to some extent have already been, held
applicable to the states. Briefly, in a federal proceeding, the right to
counsel may be waived where there in fact has been an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 63 Not
only must the waiver, to be effective, be voluntarily64 and intelligently 65
exercised, but there exists a judicial presumption against the waiver of
a constitutional right. 66 The courts require that the right to counsel
61 See, e.g., Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965); Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964); People v. Hartgraves, 31 InI. 2d 375, 202 N.E2d 33
(1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 1104 (1965) (defendant had been convicted of arson on
the basis of a confession obtained 2/2 hours after arrest); Carson v. Commonwealth,
382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964); McCoy v. State, 236 Md. 632, 204 A.2d 565 (1964); Mefford
v. State, 235 Md. 479, 201 A.2d 824 (1964) (court distinguished Escobedo as to defendant Mefford on the grounds that, since he did not request counsel, he was not
denied counsel); Bichell v. State, 235 Md. 395, 201 A.2d 800 (1964) (although the
defendants had been instructed of their right to silence, they had not requested
counsel; Escobedo distinguished on this point); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201
A.2d 681 (1964); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263 (1964); Browne
v. State, 131 N.W.2d 169 (Wis. 1964). But see Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th
Cir. 1964); Galarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964); People v. Dorado,
40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), aff'd on rehearing,42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361 (1965), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WrK 3338 (U.S. April 13, 1965) (No. 1012);
People v. Anderson, 40 Cal. Rptr. 257, 394 P.2d 945 (1964).
62 Haydn v. State, 201 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964); Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d
85 (Ky. 1964).
63 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
64 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
65 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
66 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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at trial be afforded the protection of the court 67 and that extreme caution
must be exercised when permitting waiver. Accordingly, failure to
request the assistance of counsel at trial does not constitute waiver of
the right under the sixth amendment, 68 and waiver will not be pre69
sumed from a silent record.
It is not yet clear whether the ultimate effect of Gideon will be to
apply to state proceedings the entire body of federal standards relating
to waiver of the right to counsel. 70 But it is clear that the federal
standards governing failure to request are applicable. In fact, these
71
standards were applicable even before Gideon. In Carnley v. Cochran,
the Court held that the principle that the right to counsel in a federal
proceeding does not depend on a request is "equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in state proceedings." 72 Furthermore, the Court has recently indicated that this principle shall also be
applicable to the right of court-appointed counsel under Gideon.73
It seems quite apparent that extension of the right to counsel to a
particular stage of the state proceeding carries with it the principle
74
that failure to request does not constitute a waiver.
67 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
68 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Tompkins
v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
69 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
70 See separate opinions of Douglas, J., and Harlan, J., in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). From past experience, it appears that application of the federal
standards to state prosecutions is inevitable. Cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). For a discussion of the extent to which
Gideon does and should apply federal standards to asserted waivers of the right to
counsel in state proceedings, see Comment, 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 591 (1964).
71 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
72 Id. at 515; accord, Griffith v. Rhay, 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960).
78 In a per curiam decision, the Court reversed a state decision which held that a
defendant who had failed to request the assistance of counsel was not entitled to the
appointment of counsel under Gideon. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964),
reversing 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963). The Court cited Carnley and thus
made it clear that a request was not necessary to invoke the right. In this respect,
a federal court has stated: "If we were to hold that Gideon might not be invoked
by those who did not request the assistance of counsel, we would be penalizing precisely those defendants whom Gideon was most intended to protect-those so ignorant
of or unfamiliar with criminal procedures that they were not even sufficiently sophisticated to request court-appointed counsel. . . . So to hold would make a mockery
" United
of the classic definition of waiver enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst .....
States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).
74 Accord, Gaarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964); People v.
Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), af'd on rehearing, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169,
398 P.2d 361 (1965), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3338 (U.S. April 13, 1965)
(No. 1012); People v. Anderson, 40 Cal. Rptr. 267, 394 P.2d 945 (1964) (dictum). See
Comment, 31 U. CHL L. Riv. 591 (1964). A similar result, although at a dif-
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The other waiver problem raised by the state cases is whether there
is a presumption of waiver if the accused had been advised of his right
to counsel. In light of the foregoing discussion of federal standards
of waiver, one wonders how failure of the accused to respond to the
instruction as to the right to counsel could ever be considered a
voluntary waiver of a known right. It certainly does not meet the test
that "the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."" 5
A more interesting point, however, is that the police probably have
an obligation to advise the accused of his right to counsel, not only as
a means of protecting the accused, but to ensure that waivers be
effective. This assertion is based on the premise that constitutionally
required standards relating to counsel, which prior to Gideon were
applicable only to federal prosecutions, are now applicable to the
states. Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that when the right to counsel accrues at the preliminary hearing, a
defendant be instructed of that right.76 This rule, rather than being a
mere exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory authority over the
federal courts, constitutes a statutory incorporation of the duty imposed
ferent stage of the proceeding, has developed in New York. In People v. DiBiasi,
7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960), the right to counsel after
indictment was declared to be absolute, and further interrogation in the absence of
counsel was prohibited. In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), this right was made independent of a request, and in People v.
Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962), the right was extended
to arraignment and also held not to depend upon a request. See Rothblatt & Rothblatt,
Police Interrogation:The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 24, 48-60 (1960), for a discussion of the New York cases. However, more recently, the New York Court of Appeals has refused to extend this line of cases any
(1965), it was
257 N.Y.S.2d further. In People v. Gunnar, 206, N.E.2d -,
held that a confession obtained in the absence of counsel prior to arraignment
was admissible in spite of the fact that the police had failed to inform the accused
of his right to counsel and right to silence.
Cases which hold that the right depends upon request, see note 61 supra, present
an internal inconsistency. They hold that absent a request, a waiver is presumed.
However, even those states require that in order to be effective, a waiver must be
an intelligent waiver of a known right. See, e.g., People v. Greene, 1 llI. 2d 235, 115
N.E2d 265 (1958). It would seem therefore, that when the right to counsel under
Escobedo is held waived in the absence of a request, it would at least be imperative
that the defendant be informed of his right. Not one of these cases so holds.
75 Carnley v. Cochran, 869 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (federal standard applied to a state
proceeding). But see cases cited note 61 supra.
76 FED. R. CalM. P. 44 requires the same instruction when the right to courtappointed counsel accrues at the trial.
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by the sixth amendment to advise the defendant of his right to counsel.77
It would follow that the same constitutional obligation is imposed upon
the states after Gideon,78 and to state police interrogations after
Escobedo.
Regardless of what arrangements are made to inform an accused
of his right to counsel, it is submitted that unless the accused knew of
his right to counsel and was aware of the consequences of waiver, there
can never be an effective waiver if the accused is not adequately advised
of his right.79 This follows from the general principle that a defendant
can effectively waive only known rights.80
The foregoing conclusions relating to waiver are in conformity with
the policy underlying Escobedo.81 Any holding that the right to counsel
is waived either when there has been no request, or when the accused
was not advised of his right, would create a qualification which the Court
would not sanction. Imposing these strict federal waiver standards in
77 Advisory Note 1 to FED. R. Camr. P. 44 states: "This rule is a restatement of
existing law in regard to the defendant's constitutional right of counsel as defined in
recent judicial decisions." Cited by the Advisory Note are Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938). See BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 1871, 1878, 2461-62 (1951).
78 Accord, United States v. LaVallee, 830 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 877
U.S. 998 (1964).
79 This is in conformity with the allocation of the burden of proof of waiver of
the right to court-appointed counsel. Generally, courts indulge "every reasonable
presumption against the waiver" of the right, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70 (1942), and waiver will not be presumed from a silent record, Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). Accordingly, the state must prove that the defendant was
properly offered the assistance of counsel and that the offer was expressly declined.
Id. at 516-17. If this burden is satisfied, then the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was not voluntary and intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458 (1938); Post v. Boles, 332 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964). In this
respect, when the particular facts of the case such as age, intelligence, or emotional
condition of the defendant require, the court will presume that there was no voluntary or intelligent waiver. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). In other words,
unless the state proves that the defendant was properly offered counsel, a conviction
following a trial in the absence of counsel will be reversed. E.g., United States v.
Curtiss, 30 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Plattner, 830 F.2d 271, 276 (2d
Cir. 1964) (dictum).
It is important to note that these rules were formulated for application to a trial
situation with a judge presiding. Because of the different circumstances existing in a
police station, it would not be surprising if the Court were to prescribe even more
stringent requirements to ensure proper waiver at the interrogation stage. The states
should keep this in mind when devising a procedure for informing the accused of
his rights. Possibly only a signed statement administered by an official other than a
police officer who would be able to testify that the right was voluntarily and understandingly waived will satisfy the state's burden of proof.
80 See text accompanying notes 63-69 supra. See Comment, 31 U. Cm. L. R v. 591
(1964).
81 See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
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addition to the obligation to advise the accused of his right to counsel
would further the Court's objective of ensuring an unqualified right
to counsel during police interrogation.
Escobedo had not been advised of his right to silence.8 2 Some courts

have found this to be a material fact and proceeded to hold that where
the accused had been advised of his right to silence, 8 3 the need for
counsel was eliminated.8 4 However, these courts are proceeding under
the false assumption that the only function of counsel is to inform the
accused of his fifth amendment right to silence. This view, as expressed
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, is that "one of the essentials on
which the Escobedo holding was based . . . is lacking here because
the police supplied . . . [the accused] the advice as to his rights to
remain silent which a lawyer would have given him .. .."85 Yet, even
assuming that this is the only function of counsel, it is doubtful that
a police officer intent on obtaining a confession could effectively convey
to the accused the importance and extent of his absolute right to
88

remain silent.

But the Court in Escobedo did not contemplate such a narrow
function of counsel. As has been shown, the majority was concerned
with ensuring the assistance of counsel in order to prevent the police
from taking advantage of the ignorance or inexperience of the accused,
82 In England, the conduct of the police during the interrogation is regulated in
part by the Judges Rules. Once the suspect becomes the accused, the Rules require
that the interrogating officer inform the accused of his right not to answer any further
questions. "Whenever the evidence in the possession of the police has become
sufficiently weighty to justify a charge, the charge is for this purpose treated
as having been made and the suspect is thereafter treated as the accused." DEV.IN,
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 29 (1960). See also Art. 31 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1958).
83 One week prior to Escobedo the Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964), that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was an
element of due process and therefore applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
84 See, e.g., Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965); Jackson v. United
States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (in dissent, Fahy, J., argued that under Escobedo it
is of no importance whether defendant had been advised of his right to silence or
that he failed to request the assistance of counsel); United States v. Konigsberg, 336
F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); People v. Blanks, 40 Cal. Rptr.
223 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (dictum); Carson v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 85 (Ky.
1964); Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964); Bichell v. State, 235 Md.
395, 201 A.2d 800 (1964); Peace v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A.2d 263 (1964).
85 Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824, 834 (1964).
86 See Fahy, J., dissenting in Jackson v. United States, 337 F.2d 136, 144 (D.C. Cir.
1964): "It is of no great consequence that appellant may have been advised he need
make no statement. Aside from the fact that he could hardly have remained silent
when accused, advice from the police or even a United States Commissioner that he
may remain silent is quite different from being told by counsel that he should or
should not do so."

1965

]ESCOBEDO v. ILLINOIS

as well as with ensuring the presence of counsel as an effective deterrent
to police excesses. It is dear that such an extensive function of counsel
could not, be fulfilled merely by advising the accused of his right to
silence.8 7 In this respect, the Court's emphasis on the presence of
counsel and its corresponding lack of interest in whether the accused
knew of his right to silence emphasizes the conclusion that Escobedo is
in fact a sixth amendment right to counsel case as opposed to a fifth
88
amendment confession case.
In conclusion, it is submitted that further refinement of the unqualified
right to counsel announced in Escobedo requires the application of
Gideon to the police interrogation stage.89 In light of the foregoing
discussion of the Courts policy, it would indeed, in the words of Mr.
Justice White, "be naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own
counsel."9 0 The rationale of Gideon is as applicable to the interrogation
as it is to the trial itself:
87 The conclusion that merely informing the accused of his right to silence will
not eliminate the constitutional objection to the absence of counsel is in conformity
with experience under FED. R. CmRm. P. 5(b). Among other things, rule 5(b) requires
that the accused be instructed by the United States Commissioner of his right to
silence and his right to counsel. If the basic purpose of rule 5(b) were only to
inform the accused of his right to remain silent, it would follow that a confession
obtained during illegal detention in violation of rule 5(b) would nevertheless be
admissible under the McNabb-Mallory rule if the police had advised the accused of
his right to remain silent. This would be the result according to those state cases
which hold that the basic requirement of Escobedo is to make the defendant aware
of his right to silence. But like Escobedo, rule 5 is directed at much more than the
mere right to silence---"it aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943).
In conformity with this purpose, a court of appeals has held that the function of
informing an arrested person of his right to silence was, by rule 5, "taken away from
the police, and entrusted to the independent judgment of the Commissioner." United
States v. Smith, 31 F.R.D. 553, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Furthermore, courts generally
hold that even after the accused has been properly instructed of his rights in a rule 5
preliminary hearing, any confession subsequently obtained in the absence of counsel
is inadmissible. Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (statements made
by the accused after his rule 5 preliminary hearing were held inadmissible regardless
of the fact that he had been properly instructed of his right to remain silent); Queen v.
United States, 335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964); cf., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964).
88 But see Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAtv. L. Rlv. 143, 219-20
(1964). After this comment went to press it was learned that similar conclusions are
reached in an article by Professor Herman in the forthcoming Fall 1964 issue of
the Ohio State Law Journal.
89 Contra, McQueen v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 30, 201 N.E.2d 701 (1964).

90 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (White, J., dissenting, citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1964), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
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From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on . . . safeguards designed

to assure ...[that] every defendant stands equal before the law.
This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him. 9g

Thus, when the right to counsel under Escobedo accrues, the states
should be obligated to appoint counsel for the indigent accused. Whether
or not it will substantially increase the burdens on state defender systems
and the criminal bar,92 this requirement is essential to effectuate the
Court's policy of ensuring the proper functioning of the accusatorial
system at all stages of the criminal process at which the police power
of the state is directed at a particular individual.9 3
91 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
92 The question of appointing counsel for indigents during police interrogation
raises the problem of the burdens this will place on state and bar. Although there
are no statistics relating to this precise problem, some writers have suggested that
state defender systems and the criminal bar will be incapable of assuming the burdens,
while others have suggested it can be done with relative ease. These differing opinions
seem to be a function of whether the particular writer was in favor of counsel during
interrogation and of where he obtained his information-judge, prosecutor, or defense
attorney. E.g., compare Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, in POLICE
PowER AND INDrVIDuAL FREEDOM 147 (Sowle ed. 1962) with Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, id. at 153. However, the general support
for the appointment of counsel following arrest by the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMrrTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FDER.AL CRIMINAL
JUsTIcE 38-39 (1963) (early appointment of counsel was suggested but not formally
recommended because of vigorous opposition "by those who fear its consequences on
law enforcement'), and among defense attorneys, see SILVERSTEIN, DEFENsE OF THE POOR
IN
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AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 25 (1964), indicates that the burdens on state and bar

will not be insurmountable. Implicit in these suggestions might be the belief that
an exclusionary rule such as Escobedo would discourage interrogations generally
while encouraging pre-arrest investigations, thus eliminating the need for counsel
and therefore, also any new burdens on state and bar. See, e.g., Kamisar & Choper,
The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 47-48 (1963). For general discussions of the effect of the
right to counsel during police interrogations on the administration of criminal justice,
see Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1961);
Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1051-55 (1964).
93 A further important step in this direction would be to exclude from evidence
not only confessions and incriminating statements, but any information obtained as
a result of interrogation in the absence of counsel, i.e., "fruits of the poisonous tree."
Cf. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); LocKHART, KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 788-89 (1964). The New
York cases, discussed supra note 74, have taken this step. People v. Robinson, 13
N.Y.2d 296, 196 N.E.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963).

